Arnold Padilla
IBON Foundation

Aid donors have long recognized, even before 9/11, the problems posed by armed conflict in the Philippines and the important role foreign aid plays in easing its social impact. In the mid-1990s, donors even used development aid to help facilitate the peace process in Mindanao, where Muslim groups have engaged the national government in a separatist war since the 1970s.

But the armed conflict has continued to escalate, although the national government signed a peace agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1996 and is currently in the process of forging another with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). But the 36-year old war for national liberation and democracy led by the Communist Party of the Philippines — New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) remains the biggest security concern of the government.ⁱ

The conflict in the Philippines took a new complexion after 9/11 when the current government of President Gloria Arroyo declared unconditional support for the “war on terror” declared by the Bush administration. All of a sudden, the country became a hotbed of terrorism as well as the “second front” in the war on terror. Along with it came renewed commitments from major donors for more economic and military aid.

Decades of fighting the communist and Muslim wars have taught the government that the strength of these groups lies in the wide mass support they have from the poor communities in the countryside where they operate. All-out war and peace negotiations in the past have failed because many of the social and economic issues of the people remained unaddressed.

Post-9/11 military strategists of the government have thus developed a grand design to resolve the insurgencies — the National Internal Security Plan (NISP), which more systematically combines military cam-paigns and poverty alleviation/social develop-ment initiatives, some of which are funded by official development assistance (ODA).

The intensified campaign of the national government against armed groups — whether they be legitimate rebel groups like the CPP-NPA, MILF, and MNLF, or criminal organizations like the kidnap for ransom gang, the Abu Sayyaf — within the NISP framework has distorted the concept of peace and development.

More disturbingly, the stepped-up campaign of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) against the CPP-NPA has also resulted in accusations of rampant military-perpetrated human rights abuses against non-combatants, including the rising incidence of assassinations of activists, leaders, members, and supporters of legal political parties and people’s organizations.

NISP: military hijack of development work

The perennial bankruptcy and chronic fiscal problem of the national government have made the Philippines one of the world’s most foreign aid-dependent countries in Asia. The latest available data show that the Philippines ranked sixth in 2004 among all Asian countries in terms of net ODA received from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). It also received the 11th biggest net ODA disbursement in Asia from all multilateral and bilateral donors during the same year.ⁱⁱ

Not surprisingly, the Arroyo administration was quick to capitalize on the tragic events of 9/11 to secure the commitments of aid donors to bankroll its anti-poverty campaign as well as the modernization of the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) within the framework of fighting terrorism.

The increased volume of military aid has raised the issue of aid militarization, where security and defense-related assistance has overwhelmingly outpaced the expansion of economic and anti-poverty assistance. US economic aid to the Philippines, for example, has been growing by an average of 33% per year since 9/11, a far cry from the 551% annual increase in its military aid to the country.

Increased foreign military aid and the presence of foreign troops tend to escalate existing conflicts especially in the absence of a comprehensive and effective program to address the poverty, inequity, and social injustice that feed it.

What is worse, however, is how the Arroyo administration has allowed the military establishment and its foreign supporters to hijack poverty-reduction and social development efforts in the country, including programs and projects funded by ODA.

This form of aid militarization should cause more alarm than the increase in direct military aid from foreign governments because it subsumes peace efforts, development goals, and poverty alleviation under a militarist mindset and in the process aggravates the conditions for conflict.

This military takeover is embodied in the NISP, which is one of the products of the Trilateral Senior Leader Strategic Planning Symposia between the Philippines, the US, and Australia.¹ It was approved by President Arroyo on 26 November 2001 through Memorandum Order 44.²

The NISP is anchored on tight “civilian-military links” and has adopted a multi-faceted approach to the insurgency problem in the Philippines. As described by the Department of National Defense (DND), it is “a coordinated, synchronized, interrelated and mutually supporting campaign of the whole government machinery and its resources to uplift the socio-economic condition of the Filipino people, particularly those at the local levels (sic).”³

With the DND as the lead agency, the NISP combines the social development and nation-building functions and tasks of government departments and agencies on social welfare and development, health, education, land reform, agriculture, housing, anti-poverty, etc. with the anti-insurgency and internal security campaign of the government’s armed forces.

The linking of military and civilian operations is being done through the Area Coordinating Centers (ACCs) created in places where rebel groups are strong. It is a 24-hour physical facility that serves as the “nerve center” for responding to security and development needs, including disaster relief and rehabilitation, and keeping peace and order. Through the ACCs, the AFP, the local government units (LGUs), and the local offices of national civilian agencies closely coordinate their activities.⁴

To further embed the NISP concept within the AFP, the DND is currently implementing its Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) program in which it identifies the enhancement of the AFP’s capability to conduct “civil military operations” as one of the key areas for improvement. Under this program, the military aims to “diminish the underlying socio-economic conditions and spur development in the countryside” and “support the construction of ‘Affirmative Action Roads” that will facilitate economic dispersion in conflict areas.”⁵

Under the NISP, the government no longer defines priority areas for development projects and programs in strictly development and poverty-reduction terms. What has become more important in determining priority areas for government’s social development initiatives is their strategic importance to the anti-insurgency campaign of the AFP.

The “War on poverty”

With the NISP as its strategic framework in managing conflict and addressing insurgency, the Arroyo government has designed the Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan (Unity against Poverty — KALAHI) program. KALAHI is the national government’s overarching program for a focused, accelerated, convergent, expanded, and strategic effort to reduce poverty. According to the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC), the lead agency in KALAHI, all government poverty reduction programs and projects shall be anchored on KALAHI.⁶

As envisioned in the NISP, KALAHI shall have an inter-agency convergent mechanism composed of the National KALAHI Convergent Group (NKCG) and the Regional KALAHI Convergent Group (RKCG).

Among the functions and responsibilities of the RKCG, which is made up of the regional counterparts of national agencies in the NKCG plus Local Government Units (LGUs), is “close collaboration with the AFP and the PNP” to ensure a strong link between the anti-poverty and internal security efforts of the government.⁷ Around 36 of the 65 provinces with KALAHI sites are classified as conflict areas, the majority of which are CPP-NPA guerilla fronts.

One of the major projects under the KALAHI initiative is the KALAHI-Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services (CIDSS), a six-year (2003-2008) project with $100-million in funding from the World Bank. It covers 42 of the poorest provinces in the Philippines and according to the World Bank “aims at strengthening local communities’ participation in barangay (village) governance, and developing their capacity to design, implement, and manage development activities that reduce poverty.”⁸

In reality, the KALAHI-CIDSS is essentially the “social development” component of the AFP’s pacification campaign. For example, to help implement the projects in Muslim areas in Mindanao under the KALAHI-CIDSS, President Arroyo announced in 2003 the formation of Salaam Soldiers. Salaam means peace and in this case is an acronym for the Special Advocacy on Literacy/Livelihood Advancement for Muslims.

At least half of this special team is composed of Muslim regular soldiers and integrees (former MILF or MNLF rebels) who have been tasked to provide “psycho-social and medico-civic services” as well as to ensure peace and order in their area. But the AFP itself said that the Salaam Soldiers are similar to the special operations teams (SOTs) deployed in insurgency areas in the early 1990s.

The SOTs combined civic action with intelligence-gathering and were largely credited for the decline of the communist insurgency in some regions of the country. Together with vigilante and paramilitary groups, they were accused of countless human rights violations in Mindanao.

Development funds for war

Strictly speaking, military aid does not qualify as ODA under DAC definitions. However, as many critics have pointed out, official policy papers calling for a re-definition of aid imply a clear link between poverty and terrorism and the need for aid “calibration” more in keeping with the new counter-terrorism-centered security agenda, thus “militarizing” ODA.⁹

DAC donors attempt to downplay this concern with clarifications on the eligibility of conflict, peace, and security expenditures as ODA. Donors, for instance, say that “eligible assistance is limited to non-military competence/capacity-building and strategic planning activities that promote political, institutional and financial accountability, civilian oversight, and transparency,” and that “any such support to defense ministries must be part of a national security system reform strategy.”¹⁰

They further claim that support for civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution activities including capacity-building, monitoring, dialogue and information exchange must exclude engagement in military strategy and defense cooperation.

But in the Philippine case, the NISP-KALAHI has put poverty alleviation and social development — the core purposes of ODA — within the ambit of the government’s military campaign against insurgency. Therefore, practically all bilateral and multilateral ODA funding for such programs and projects is being used for military operations.

This has serious implications because aside from ODA’s falling behind in terms of annual growth compared to military aid, that part of ODA which the DAC defines as conflict and security-related expenditures has also been eating into an increasing portion of DAC donors’ ODA to the Philippines since 9/11 at the expense of other sectors that directly benefit the poor and marginalized.

To illustrate, between 2001 and 2004, DAC funding for conflict, peace, and security has been growing by 59% per year, while funding for health has been declining every year by 2 percent. Consequently, the share of ODA expenditures for conflict, peace, and security grew from 8% to 16%, while the total ODA for social infrastructure and services like health and education fell from 14% to 3% during the same period. (See Graphs 2 and 3.)

Graph 2. Annual Growth of ODA Commitments from DAC Donors for Social Infrastructure & Services in the Philippines, 2001-2004

Source of Basic Data: OECD-DAC

Graph 3. Distribution of DAC ODA Commitments for Social Infrastructure and Services in the Philippines, 2001-2004

Source of Basic Data: OECD-DAC

Shortcut to peace

Mindanao has a special place in the overall peace and security efforts of the national government and donors. Some analysts have pointed out that this is not only because of the dramatic attacks by the notorious Abu Sayyaf terrorist group based in Mindanao. A more compelling reason behind the campaign to stabilize security in Mindanao is the huge economic potential of the region owing to its vast but under-exploited natural resources.

Major donors with economic interests in Mindanao like the United States, Japan, Australia, and Canada have been directing a substantial portion of their aid to the Philippines for the resolution of the conflict in Mindanao. A partial list of these programs and projects show that at least $112 million in DAC ODA is directly being used for the peace efforts in the region mainly for livelihood projects for former Muslim rebels as well as social and economic infrastructure. (See Table 5.)

Consistent with the NISP approach, the national government and the donors also continue to use ODA as a bargaining chip to entice Muslim rebels into surrendering. The national government, for instance, has been trying to raise resources for the Mindanao Peace Fund. The Fund would be used to build soft and hard infrastructure in Mindanao, but would only be available if the national government and the MILF reach a final peace agreement.

The US initially committed $30 million, but later withdrew a portion of it and blamed the ”slow progress” in the government-MILF peace talks.¹¹ Other contributors to the peace fund include the World Bank ($2 million plus administration of the fund), Australia (amount to be determined), European donors, and UN agencies.

By making the conclusion of a peace agreement a prerequisite to access to the fund, the proponents actually defeat its purpose of helping achieve genuine and lasting peace in Mindanao. The need for rehabilitation and poverty reduction cannot wait for the conclusion of peace talks and may actually provide field conditions to promote peace. On the other hand, using development funds as enticement for concluding peace talks has failed as experience in Mindanao shows, nor can development funds be used as a shortcut to sustainable peace.

The national government already tried this approach in 1996 when it signed a peace agreement with the MNLF.ⁱⁱⁱ But only five years later, an MNLF faction continued the armed struggle against the government because the underlying issues of their revolution had not been addressed by the peace agreement.^iv

Increased military aid

Meanwhile, US military aid has been pouring into the country since 9/11. Arroyo’s support for the US “war on terror” has warmed Philippine–US aid relations, which turned “cold” when in 1991 the extension of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement (MBA) that allowed the US to maintain naval and air bases and other military facilities in different parts of the country was rejected by the Philippine Senate.

From 1992 to 1997, US military and economic aid to the Philippines had steadily declined until the 1998-1999 period when the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which allowed joint military exercises and training between Filipino and American troops, was negotiated and eventually approved. But the sharpest increases in US aid occurred after 9/11 with American military assistance to the Philippines growing by a staggering 1,639% between 2001 and 2002.¹² (See Graph 4.)

The Philippines now ranks as one of the most important destinations of US military aid worldwide. Between 2001 and 2005, for instance, US Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for the Philippines is expected to have increased by 1,171%. In comparison US FMF for Afghanistan is projected to have increased by 692% during the same period; Israel, 11%, and Pakistan, 98 percent. Note, however, that while US FMF for the Philippines is one of the fastest growing in the world, Afghanistan, Israel, and Pakistan still account for the biggest share in US FMF.^{v 13}

Aside from the provision of military hardware, US military aid to the Philippines also involves the conduct of the Balikatan (rough translation: shouldering the load together) exercises. The Balikatan actually started in 1981 under the 1952 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), but has become bigger in terms of the number of visiting US soldiers as well as the frequency and scope of the exercises under the 1999 VFA and the “War on Terror”.^vi

Another active donor in terms of military assistance to the Philippines is Australia, which has an ongoing three-year (2003-2006) $5-million Philippine Counter-Terrorism Assistance initiative. The package aims to build the capacity of key government agencies to combat terrorism with a particular focus on law enforcement, border control, port security, and regional cooperation.¹⁴

It includes the 18-month Port Security Capacity-Building Project worth $1.3 million and the Australian Aid (AusAid) /AFP law enforcement counter-terrorism capacity-building project worth $3.65 million, both approved in April 2004.

In October 2005, President Arroyo held a closed-door meeting with Australia’s defense minister. Manila and Canberra affirmed their commitment to a higher level of security cooperation in fighting terrorism. The two countries are now in the process of ironing out an agreement to enhance military cooperation particularly on intelligence exchanges, maritime security, and military training.¹⁵ Under this pact, Australian soldiers may hold regular military exercises with their Filipino counterparts similar to the Balikatan.

Aside from the US and Australia, the Philippines also has existing defense cooperation programs with other major DAC donors such the UK, France, Spain, and Italy.

Graph 4. Comparative Annual Growth of US Military and Economic Aid to the Philippines 1991-2003

Source of Basic Data: US Overseas Loans & Grants (Greenbook)

Reign of (state) terror

As the Arroyo administration aggressively used anti-poverty and social development initiatives as well as foreign military aid in the government’s intensified campaign against insurgency in the country, an alarming trend in human rights abuses has began to afflict the people, particularly in the vast Philippine countryside. While human rights violations perpetrated by military and paramilitary units against civilians are no longer new, such attacks have become more numerous and more vicious since President Arroyo declared all-out support for the US-led war on terrorism.

The incidence of assassination of leaders and members of militant groups and progressive political parties as well as their supporters has been rising since 2001. Anyone — from town officials, church leaders, and lawyers to activists, ordinary farmers and workers — suspected of supporting or being a member of the CPP-NPA could be targeted for assassination. Meanwhile, the number of murdered journalists in the provinces in the last five years has also been steadily increasing.

In Mindanao, the atrocities of military units against the Muslim people remain unabated. In February 2005, for example, five Muslim civilians including a 14-year old boy were massacred in the province of Sulu by soldiers from the 53rd Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army. One of the victims, a village official, was accused by the military of being an Abu Sayyaf member.¹⁶

An independent report by the human rights group Karapatan (Rights) recorded a total of 150 victims of political killings in 2005, of which 80 were confirmed activists while 70 were suspected by the military to be sympathizers, supporters, friends, or relatives of communist or Muslim rebels. The number of victims of political killings from January to November 2005 is almost double the annual average from 2001 to 2004. (See Table 6.) Overall, 874 different cases of human rights violations have been recorded in 2005 involving 99,011 victims, “the worst since the days of the dictator Ferdinand Marcos,” the group said.¹⁷

Peace means social justice

Donors may argue that they should not be held accountable for the human rights abuses that the Philippine military may have been committing, since, unlike the military aid that some donors like the US and Australia provide, their engagement in the country is only in the field of social development and poverty alleviation. But as already discussed, the NISP has already blurred the distinction between military operations and social development/poverty alleviation work.

The NISP is bound to perpetuate conflict in the Philippines because the military establishment is oriented and trained for war and conflict. ODA resources used within a strategic framework of subsuming the peace and development process under a military-defined internal security effort therefore help perpetuate the conflict and the rampant violation of the people’s most fundamental human rights.

It is thus imperative for all donors to take a hard look at how their programs and projects in the Philippines are being hijacked for the militarist pacification campaign of the government.

At the minimum, direct military aid and other forms of foreign assistance to the AFP and PNP must be immediately suspended in the light of the alleged state/military terrorism and violence against the people.

Clear, verifiable standards and mechanisms must be put in place to distinguish ODA poverty reduction programs from government anti-insurgency programs which must not be allowed to use ODA funds. ODA funded programs for peace and development in conflict areas must be decentralized and implemented by independent parties involving non-government players and the local communities in particular. The government and its armed units are adversaries directly engaged in the war, and as such they should not have a monopoly over peace and development work. In many cases, popular confidence in the government and the military is seriously challenged in conflict areas, creating difficulties in providing effective services and even in implementing infrastructure projects.

However, for the engagement of non-government players and affected communities to be more effective, the NISP framework must be abandoned because it does not promote the democratic participation of other forces in society in the peace and development process in the conflict areas. Non-government development workers face a serious danger of being tagged as terrorists or enemies of the state, if they act independent of government, because of the AFP’s anti-insurgency campaigns and the NISP framework.

There will never be lasting peace and sustainable development without social justice. Social justice can only be defined by the people themselves — the landless farmers and other marginalized sectors who make up the base support of the communists and the poor Muslims who have suffered decades of displacement and oppression — and cannot be imposed by the military nor by well-meaning donors.

Annexes

Annex 1. Brief Profile of Major Rebel Groups in the Philippines

Annex 2. Long-Term Distribution of Net ODA Disbursement to the Philippines

Source of Basic Data: DAC-OECD

Annex 3. Long-Term Annual Growth Rate ODA Disbursement to the Philippines

Source of Basic Data: DAC-OECD

Annex 4. Distribution of ODA Net Disbursed to the Philippines, By Donor, 2004

Notes

1. See Annex 1 for a brief profile of the major armed rebel groups in the Philippines.

2. See Annexes 2, 3, & 4 for an overview of the long-term distribution of and annual growth rate in net ODA disbursement to the Philippines from 1960 to 2004, as well as the current distribution of bilateral ODA funding in the country by donor.

3. The Ramos administration (1992-1998) used a package of ODA-funded social development programs and projects to woo the MNLF to surrender and sign a peace agreement with the government. The package would supposedly help in the “transition” of the MNLF rebels from guerrilla fighters to productive and law-abiding citizens. A USAID livelihood project under the package, for instance, was responsible for enticing 13,000 MNLF fighters to surrender and reintegrate into the mainstream society.

4. According to Khaid O. Ajibon, MNLF State Chairman of the Sulu State Revolutionary Committee, the issues of the ongoing conflict between the MNLF and the Philippine government are: (1) The root causes of the war, which includes the issue of the Moro people’s right to self-determination; (2) Non-implementation of the 1996 GRP (Government of the Republic of the Philippines)-MNLF Peace Agreement; (3) Continuing human rights abuses against the Moro people; and (4) Justice for MNLF chairperson Nur Misuari who was jailed for rebellion in 2001. (For more details, please see “Sulu: State of War, Calls for Peace” by Atty. Soliman M. Santos Jr. which can be accessed at http://www.cyberdyaryo.com/commentary/c2005_0506_01.htm)

5. In 2005, the World Policy Institute estimated that US FMF for the Philippines was $29.8 million. Israel remains the largest beneficiary of US FMF with $2.2 billion, followed by Afghanistan ($396 million); Jordan ($204.4 million); and Pakistan ($148.8 million). To access the complete list of US FMF beneficiaries, please visit http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/WatWTable3.html.

6. The gross imbalances in the VFA favoring the US, particularly the provision allowing US custody of US military personnel involved in criminal cases committed in the Philippines, again became a national debate when a 22-year old Filipina accused five US Marines of rape. The US suspects were among the 4,500 troops who arrived in the country in October 2005 for one of the Balikatan exercises.

Endnotes

¹ Trilateral Strategic Defense Capability Planning Symposium by Dr. Kent Hughes Butts and Lieutenant Colonel Curtis Turner, US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership, Issue Paper, Volume 7-04, September 2004

² The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Strategic Implications for Philippine-China-US Relations by Professor Rommel C. Banloi, Paper presented at the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies on Zhongshan University, Guangzhou, China, in connection with his visit on 8-17 January 2002

³ Department of National Defense, Accomplishment Report, January to June 2004

⁴ “Civilianizing the War” by Marites Dañguilan Vitug, Newsbreak, 15 April 2002

⁵ Implementing the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) Program, Department of National Defense (http://www.dnd.gov.ph/DNDWEBPAGE_files/html/pt1agenda.htm)  

⁶ Briefer on the Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan (KALAHI), National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC) in cooperation with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

⁷ KALAHI Database, National Anti-Poverty Commission (http://www.napc.gov.ph/)

⁸ Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan – Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services (KALAHI-CIDSS) Project, Projects and Operations, The World Bank (http://web.worldbank.org/ external/projects/main?pagePK=104231&piPK=73230&theSitePK=40941& menuPK=228424& Projectid=P077012)

⁹ From the War on Poverty to the War on Terror? The Shifting Priorities of ODA By Carl Dundas, GSD Network, BOND 2004 as cited in Financing the Millennium Development Goals by Christine Auclair, Third World Resurgence, Issue No. 180-181, August/September 2005

¹⁰ The ODA Eligibility of Conflict, Peace, and Security Expenditures, Background Note, DAC Meeting, 10-11 February 2005

¹¹ “Government Sorry for US Partial Pullout of Funds in Mindanao” by Maila Ager, Inquirer News Service, 7 July 2004 (http://www.inq7.net/brk/2004/jul/07/brkpol_8-1.htm)

¹² Aid figures were generated from the US Overseas Loans and Grants [Greenbook] (http://qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/)

¹³ Growth figures were based on data from the World Policy Institute, Arms Trade Resource Center (http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/WatWTable3.html)

¹⁴ Reducing Terrorism Risks in the Philippines, Australian Aid, Media Release, 27 April 2004 (http://www.ausaid.gov.au/media/release.cfm?BC=Media&Id=7540_4789_3694_2613_1112)

¹⁵ “RP Thanks Australia for Military Aid” by Genalyn D. Kabiling, Manila Bulletin, 18 October 2005

¹⁶ “The Philippines’ Nasty Little War” by Leila Halud and Tyrone Velez, Asia Times, 13 April 2005

¹⁷ “Militant Group Accuses Government of Rights Abuses,” Agence France Presse, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 3 December 2005