

Japan: Emphasizing SDGs but Increased Instrumentalisation Under the New Development Cooperation Charter

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Overview

- According to the OECD-DAC preliminary ODA figures for 2017, Japan's ODA in 2017 was US\$11.48 billion, representing a 13.9% increase from 2016. This accounts for 0.23% of Japan's GNI, up from 0.20% in 2016.¹ Although this is far below the internationally agreed target of 0.7% Japan is, nonetheless, the fourth largest donor among the members of the DAC.
- The main characteristics of Japan's ODA are as follows: 1) geographically it is focused on Asian countries; 2) sectorally, economic infrastructure and other growth-oriented actors are emphasized; and 3) loan modalities are a major modality. While these approaches have been criticized by CSOs, they have not changed significantly since the first *Reality of Aid* report was released in 1993.
- The current policy framework for Japan's aid is the Development Cooperation Charter, approved by the cabinet in February 2015. It was a revision of the 1992 ODA Charter, which was later revised in 2003. When the process for the second revision started in March 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) made it clear that the new Charter should be aligned to the Abe government's security policy, announced in December of the previous year, as well as Japan's economic revitalisation plan. In other words, the amendment of the ODA Charter was aimed at further instrumentalising aid for Japan's security and commercial interests. At the beginning of the process, the Vice Foreign Minister said, "ODA will play a role in security-related fields."² In JANIC's chapter to *Reality of Aid 2016* it was noted that CSOs had three major concerns with the new Charter: 1) securitisation of aid; 2) dominance of growth-centered vision and 3) (re)commercialisation of aid.³

In the past three years since the new Charter was announced, what has really taken place? This chapter focuses on how a growth-centered view is reflected in Japan's ODA policy and allocation. It also examines how aid policy and programs have been instrumentalised for the country's security and commercial self-interests.

SDGs and Japan's Aid Policy

Following the adoption at the UN General Assembly in September 2015 of Agenda 2030, including the SDGs, the MoFA and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the implementing agency for Japan's ODA, emphasized Japan's role in implementing the SDGs. While this commitment is welcomed, a major concern is that their views on SDGs are too growth-centered, as noted in JANIC's chapter in *The Reality of Aid 2016*:

"While the 1992 and 2003 Charters both had poverty alleviation and growth as priorities, the new one puts forward "quality growth' and poverty eradication through such growth.

The new Charter maintains that “quality growth” must be inclusive, sustainable and resilient, but these statements give the impression that the assumption is that growth is the priority and poverty reduction is the result of growth.”⁴

An examination of MoFA and JICA publications reveals that their views on SDGs reflects Japan’s emphasis on “‘quality growth’ and poverty eradication through such growth,” rather than directly addressing conditions affecting poverty eradication. This view is reflected in the sectoral allocation of Japan’s ODA – more than half of Japan’s ODA goes to economic infrastructure -- which will be described later in this chapter.

The Japanese Government’s 2017 Annual Report on ODA (published by MoFA) has a section on roles Japan’s ODA has been playing in achieving the SDGs. It highlights the fact that Japan has mainstreamed SDGs both in domestic and international cooperation policies covering issues such as climate change, universal health coverage and peace-building. The Report elaborates details on Japan’s aid programs, including aid for infrastructure and human resource development, support for sectors such as health and population, water and sanitation, quality education as well as the empowerment of women. But, this section is titled “‘Quality Growth’ and Poverty Eradication through Such Growth,” and its preface emphasizes that while it must be inclusive and sustainable, growth is an indispensable premise for poverty eradication.⁵

In September 2016, “*JICA’s Position Paper on SDGs: Toward Achieving Sustainable Development Goals*” was launched. That JICA produced a paper on SDGs is significant. The paper maintains that SDGs are consistent with JICA’s philosophy of “realizing ‘human security’ and ‘quality growth’ in order to contribute to peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community.”⁶JICA, however, cautions that there are differences between SDGs and Japan’s aid philosophy:

“The SDGs do not clearly specify the securing of diversity with respect for each country’s cultural and social values. Japan has experiences of supporting various development patterns respecting partner countries’ different cultural and social values, which should be further strengthened from the viewpoint of peace, stability and prosperity of the international community.”⁷

It is not clear what this qualification really means in practice. Depending on the interpretation of “respecting each country’s cultural and social values,” it could undermine the universality principle of Agenda 2030.

JICA also describes its “scenario” for achieving the SDGs by merging the seventeen goals into the following five, while also arguing that the seventeen goals are indivisible:

1. Goals that JICA contributes through comprehensive response: Goals 1 (End poverty), 5 (Gender equality), 10 (Reduced inequalities), and 16 (Peace and governance)
2. Goals that JICA approaches as core development areas: Goals 3 (Health), 4 (Education), 2 (End hunger) and 6 (Water and sanitation)

3. Goals that JICA plays the key role: Goals 2 (End hunger), 3 (Health), 4 (Education), 6 (Water and sanitation), 7 (Energy), 8 (Economic growth), 9 (Industry and infrastructure), 11 (Sustainable cities), 13 (Climate actions), and 15 (Forests and biodiversity)
4. Goals that JICA considers necessary means of implementation: Goal 17 (Partnerships)
5. Goals that JICA plays a catalytic role working with civil society and the private sector: Goals 8 (Economic growth) and 12 (Sustainable consumption and production)

It could be questioned why Goals 1 (End poverty), 5 (Gender equality) and 16 (Peace and governance) are not considered as “key” or “core” development areas (SDGs in area two above). It gives the impression that instead of directly tackling poverty or gender equality, they will be mainstreamed and achieved as results or by-products of efforts in the four “core” or ten “key” goals.⁸

Regarding Goal 5 (Gender equality), 37% of Japan’s ODA was directed to support gender equality and women’s empowerment, only slightly less than the DAC average of 40%. But if we look at aid with gender equality and women’s empowerment as the *principal objective*, while the DAC total is 4.4%, for Japan it is only 0.8%.⁹ Given the critical importance of gender equality, why would JICA not add Goal 5 in its “key” or “core” areas to enhance Japan’s efforts on gender equality?

In MoFA and JICA policy papers, little attention is given to human rights-based approaches (HRBA). MoFA’s publications mention human rights as important values but there are few references to HRBA. JICA’s position paper on SDGs says nothing about human rights.

Aid Volume in 2017


Around the time the first *Reality of Aid* report was published in 1993, Japan was the largest donor among the OECD-DAC members. But since 2001 and the government’s decision to cut the aid budget because of a budget deficit, Japan’s aid volume has generally been in decline.

According to the DAC preliminary figures for 2017, set out in April 2018, Japan’s ODA in 2017 was US\$11.48 billion, representing a 13.9% increase from 2016. This level of aid accounts for 0.23% of Japan’s GNI, up from 0.20% in 2016 but far below the internationally agreed target of 0.7%.¹⁰ The OECD says that the increase was “due to an increase in its bilateral aid to least developed countries as well as loans.”¹¹ Whether other factors contributed to this increase is unknown as up to date statistics from the OECD or the Japanese government are not yet available.

Aid Allocation

Geographically, Japan’s has emphasized aid for Asian countries. As shown in Figure 1, Japan allocates over 55% of ODA to Asian countries. While DAC members allocate 22.6% for Sub-Saharan Africa, Japan provides only 10.6% of its aid to the sub-continent.


Figure 1: Geographical Allocation of Japan's Aid Compared with Total DAC (2015-16: Gross Disbursement)
Source: OECD Development Finance Data



The top ten recipients in 2015-16 were countries in Asia: India, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Iraq, Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, Afghanistan, Thailand and Pakistan. Distribution for LDCs was only 20.8% (gross disbursement). However, according to the OECD, it is likely that this figure went up in 2017.

Sectorally, most DAC members emphasize aid for social development sectors such as health, education and population as well as other social infrastructure, especially government and civil society. Japan's emphasis has always been on economic infrastructure such as transportation, communication and energy. In fact, the share of aid for economic infrastructure has been increasing in the past few years. In late 2000's and early 2010's, it was around 40%, while in the last few years it has been over 50%. This may be the result of the recent government's emphasis on "quality growth' and poverty eradication through such growth."

Figure 2: Sectoral Allocation of Japan's ODA Compared with Total DAC (2015-16: commitment)
Source: OECD Development Finance Data



Only 27.2% of Japan's ODA was provided as grants. In contrast, 77.2% of DAC members' aid was given as grants and the percentage of grants was over 95% for 21 countries, including 13 countries that provided all of their aid as grants.

In *Reality of Aid*, 1993, JANIC criticized Japan's aid program as being both too focused on Asia and on growth-oriented sectors rather than sectors directly related to poverty reduction. It also stated that the share of loans was too great.¹² Sadly, throughout the 25 years history of the *Reality of Aid*, the writers of the country report of Japan, have continued to raise this issue, with little or no change.

Instrumentalisation of Japan's Aid

An examination of the ODA policy of the Abe government (in office since December 2012) reveals that aid has strongly aligned to the government's security and domestic economic policy.

Securitisation of Aid

Among the four principles of the ODA Charter (approved by the Cabinet in 1992 and revised in 2003) was "any use of ODA for military purposes or for aggravation of international conflicts should be avoided." In the second revision of the Development Cooperation Charter, approved in February 2015, the idea of avoiding the use of aid for military purposes was retained. However, a sentence was added to open ways to possibly support for armed forces or members of armed forces in recipient countries:

Avoidance of any use of development cooperation for military purposes or for aggravation of international conflicts: Japan will avoid any use of development cooperation for military purposes or for aggravation of international conflicts. In case the armed forces or members of the armed forces in recipient countries are involved in development cooperation for non-military purposes such as public welfare or disaster-relief purposes, such cases will be considered on a case-by-case basis in light of their substantive relevance. (Emphasis added by the author)¹³

Despite the Vice Foreign Minister's acknowledgement that aid would play a role in security-related fields, after parliamentary debates, the final 2015 Charter only allows aid for armed forces or their personnel in cases of public welfare or disaster-response purposes. However, CSOs are concerned that there is potential for the government to expand the scope of its military-related aid. CSOs also fear that equipment provided for non-military purposes could be converted for military purposes in the future.

In the past three years under the new Charter, there have been cases where ODA was provided for projects involving the armed forces or their members of the recipient countries. For the most part, these were projects related to disaster prevention although there have also been several big projects that support the marine coast guards in several Asian countries.

At the ODA Policy Council of the NGO-Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regular Consultation Meetings in July 2017, securitisation of aid was one of the issues discussed.¹⁴ MoFA disclosed a list of aid projects and programs that involved the recipient country armed forces or their members and another list of major projects and programs related to anti-terrorism, public security and maritime security.¹⁵

According to the MoFA's list, there have been 23 projects and programs that have involved recipient countries' military or their personnel after the Charter was announced in February 2015. Several analytical points are apparent from this list:

- Twelve (12) of the 23 projects and programs have been aimed at disaster prevention;
- In twenty (20) out of the 23 projects and programs, military personnel were part of the participants in training programs, or the military was part of the beneficiaries among various ministries and departments involved;
- In the three cases where the military was directly supported, two gave assistance to the Military Band of Papua New Guinea (PNG). In another case the military was in charge of disaster prevention; and
- Three projects in Indonesia and Malaysia aimed to support the coast guard in its capacity for information gathering, and military members were included among the participants. This support could possibly aggravate geo-political tensions in the South China Sea.

To date, the principle of avoiding Japan's aid being used for direct military purposes, or the aggravation of international conflicts, has been observed. But it is important to continue monitoring this area, to ensure that the government does not expand the scope of its military-related aid or that the equipment and knowledge provided for non-military purposes through aid is not converted or used for military purposes in the future.

The list of major projects and programs related to anti-terrorism, public security and maritime security included the names of 32 initiatives in 16 countries. Most of the projects for African countries (Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Mali, Mauritania, Kenya and Rwanda) and two MENA countries (Jordan and Morocco) were for public security. Included in the Nigerian plan was a project to prevent human-trafficking. Projects for countries in South Asia (Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Maldives) entailed several objectives: anti-terrorism, anti-piracy, maritime safety and security and prevention of crimes such as drug trafficking. All projects related to anti-terrorism, public security and maritime security in the above-mentioned countries were supported through either financial grants or technical cooperation.

The most controversial initiatives are probably the loan projects to Vietnam (signed in June 2017 for 38.4 billion Yen (US\$350 million) and to the Philippines (October 2016 for 16.5 billion Yen (US\$150 million). In both cases, patrol boats were provided to enhance the capacity of these countries' coast guards in maritime law enforcement, again potentially compounding tensions in the South China Sea.¹⁶

When the discussion to revise the Development Cooperation Charter were initiated in spring 2014, there was a media report that the intention of the Abe Government was to lift the ban on the use of ODA for military purposes. One example given was the support to the Philippines and Vietnam (both having territorial disputes with China) to construct military-civilian ports¹⁷ These intentions were later denied by the government.

In the case of Vietnam, the coast guard was part of the navy until 2013 when it was reclassified as an organization independent of the military. According to a media report, it was Japan that proposed this restructuring as a way of getting around the previous Charter ban on support to the military.¹⁸ During the process of the 2014-15 revision of the Charter, there was a speculation that one reason why the Abe government wanted aid to play roles in military-related fields is to prevent a similar situation – asking the recipient countries to restructure their governmental agencies – in happening again.

In November 2016, the governments of Malaysia and Japan signed an Exchange of Note, which granted two patrol vessels used by the Japan Coast Guard (scheduled to retire) to the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) and to provide grant aid aimed at contributing to the improvement of maritime safety and security.¹⁹ While the aid is described as part of ODA, the provision of the two patrol vessels is not.

Vietnam, Philippines and Japan all have ongoing territorial disputes with China. Malaysia, too, is a country that faces the South China Sea. Japan considers China a threat and responding to China's growing influence in the region has been a key priority of Abe's government foreign policy. The provision of patrol ships to Vietnam and the Philippines as well as the grant to Malaysia could be seen as an indication that Japan's ODA is increasingly aligned to its security interests. In its relations with the Philippines and Vietnam, it should be noted that, although it will not be counted as ODA, the Abe government has been expanding technical cooperation and the provision of equipment to the militaries of both countries.

(Re)commercialisation of Aid

(1) Issues relating to Tied Aid

In the early days of Japan's aid program, up until the 1970's, government policy documents explicitly stated that the major objective of the country's aid programs was to promote Japan's export and investment: commercial self-interest was unapologetically dominant. At one point, more than 95% of Japan's bilateral aid was tied to Japanese suppliers. Following criticisms of the country's huge trade surplus, Japan started to untie its aid. In the mid-2000's, DAC statistics (which excludes technical aid) demonstrated that 90% to 95% of Japan's aid was formally untied, approximating and sometimes above the DAC donor overall performance.

But this performance was not sustained. The business community has always been advocating for the government to increase tied aid. In 2016, as a result of increased pressure, 77.4% of Japan's ODA was untied, 12.4% tied. Japan did not report the tying status of 10.2% of its aid.²⁰

There are also issues with how the Japanese government reports to the DAC on the tying status. According to the *DAC Peer Review Report* in 2010:

“Japan considers a project to be untied even if it requires the primary contractor to be Japanese. It justifies this on the grounds that the primary contractor is the project manager and is able to sub-contract freely. However, where primary contractors have to be Japanese and can act as both agents and suppliers of goods or services (including management) Japan should report such aid as tied.”²¹

As of yet the Japanese government has not taken any measures to respond to this recommendation.

Another issue is the STEP Yen Loan scheme (Special Terms for Economic Partnership). According to JICA, “STEP was introduced in July 2002, with a view to raising the visibility of Japanese ODA among citizens in both recipient countries and Japan through best use of advanced technologies and know-how of Japanese firms.”²² Although the interest rate is much lower than for ordinary yen loans, it is *tyed* to the procurement of Japanese goods and services.

Notably, an increasing number of large STEP projects have recently focused on the transportation sector. Examples include:

- Improvement of the Philippine National Railway and construction of the subway in Metro-Manila;
- Improvement of roads in Metro-Manila;
- High-speed train construction in India;
- New airport terminals in Hanoi and Ulaanbaatar; and
- Improvement of the commuter train system in Jakarta

The 2010 *DAC Peer Review Report* raised concerns about STEP loans, saying that they “can act as an incentive for partner countries to choose tied conditions.” The Report recommended “Japan should ensure that its untied loans are as favourable as its tied loans. Further roll out of the STEP scheme could also threaten the progress Japan has made in untying. If Japan is to untie further, it will need to phase out STEP loans.”²³

The 2014 *DAC Peer Review Report* recommended “Japan should look for opportunities to reverse the decline in untied aid.” Japan was criticized for not implementing the recommendations around tied aid presented in the 2010 review. Concerns raised in the 2014 review around tied aid include the following:

- Although reporting the tying status of technical aid is not mandatory, most DAC members do. Japan does not. Since there is an agreement that all members should report the tying status of all aid, Japan should report the tying status of its technical aid.
- Despite the 2010 recommendation Japan, still reports to the DAC aid as untied that must be procured through Japanese prime contractors.²⁴

From a CSO perspective, Japan's aid should be untied, and there should be a fundamental reconsideration—including complete termination -- of the STEP scheme. CSOs also maintain that Japan should follow the DAC peer review recommendations regarding tying status reporting.

(2) Development Cooperation Charter

At the beginning of the 2014/15 process to revise the ODA Charter to the new Development Cooperation Charter, "*Japan's Revitalization Strategy*" was presented as a justification and foundation for the new Charter, although not explicitly stated in the final version. Among the Charter's basic policies and principles, "dialogue and collaboration based on Japan's experience and expertise" and "cooperation that takes advantage of Japan's strength" were identified. Use of Japan's experience and expertise is common to the idea behind the STEP. While the Development Cooperation Charter does not mention STEP, new commitments for STEP loan projects were significantly increased in FY 2015; from 90 billion Yen (US\$800 million) in the previous year to 831 billion Yen (US\$7.5 billion). However, it dropped to 134 billion Yen in FY 2016.²⁵ It will be important to monitor whether the new Development Cooperation Charter will bring about mid and long-term increases of STEP loan projects.

Also, noted in the previous JANIC's chapter in *Reality of Aid 2016*, the new Charter refers to the possibility that Japan would be "proactively presenting proposals while giving full consideration to policies, programs and institutions" of developing countries. The Japanese government has always maintained that its aid is implemented under the "request-based principle." Instead of Japan's aid agencies proactively proposing projects or programs, they respect the requests by partner countries' governments, thereby respecting ownership of developing countries. Ironically, given the current increased global consensus on developing countries' ownership for development effectiveness, the Japanese government, as a result of pressure from the business community, now talks about a donor's proactive proposal.

In addition to the Charter, the JICA's SDGs position paper also refers to the utilization of Japan's knowledge and experience in achieving the SDGs.²⁶ While not to reject this idea all together, it is important to note that it was proposed by the business community as one way to align Japan's aid with its commercial interests. Depending on how Japan's knowledge and skills are practically utilized, this approach could prove to be at odds with the ownership principles repeatedly agreed at a series of high level forums and meetings on aid and development effectiveness in Accra (2008), Busan (2011), Mexico City (2014) and Nairobi (2016).²⁷

Climate Change and Japan's ODA

MoFA's annual report on ODA in 2017 emphasized that Japan plays an important role in tackling climate change.²⁸ In the DAC annual report, Japan is named as one of the countries that has "maintained strong financial commitment to the environment and climate change." In 2015, 52.7% of bilateral allocable aid supported the environment (DAC average: 33.2%), and 48.8% focused on climate change (DAC average: 26.2%).²⁹ While this is commendable, the

other reality is that Japan has been criticised for supporting coal-fired power plants in emerging economies such as Vietnam and Indonesia.

In early 2018, the Advisory Panel to the Foreign Minister on Climate Change was organized. In its final report, the Panel recommended that “Japan should focus on energy efficiency and renewable energy deployment for providing support to developing countries. Japan should aim for the immediate end to the public assistance for the export of coal-fired power.”³⁰The report noted that this would be consistent with the world’s trend to focus on renewable energy.

Conclusion

The Japanese government has been emphasizing the SDGs in both domestic and international aid policies. However, in reality, the policies and approach of Japan’s aid agencies on the SDGs and Agenda 2030 have tended to stress “quality growth” and view poverty eradication as the by-product or result of “quality growth.” The reality is, that under the new Development Cooperation Charter, announced seven months before the adoption of Agenda 2030 at the United Nations, Japan’s aid programs have increasingly been instrumentalised for security and commercial objectives.

Instrumentalisation of aid is also part of Japan’s response to China’s growing influence particularly its “Belt and Road” strategy, which is considered by Shinzo Abe’s government as a security threat. Commercialisation and securitisation of Japan’s aid could be considered as a response to the economic dimensions of this Chinese strategy in the region. The increase of STEP loans in the transportation sector in Asian countries is particularly relevant as it is a measure that competes with an increase in China’s tied aid in the same sector and the same countries.

Aid should not be seen as an instrument that competes with or counters the strategies of a neighboring country that is increasing its influence in terms of both military and economic power, and is also emerging as an aid donor. From the CSO perspective, aid policies should focus on action plans to achieve the SDGs, while emphasizing principles that aim to end poverty, leave no one behind, promote environmental sustainability, gender equality and human rights-based development. A fundamental shift in Japan’s aid policy is indispensable to achieve these goals.

¹OECD, “Development aid stable in 2017 with more sent to poorest countries,” Press Release, 9 April 2018.

²*Asahi Shimbun*, April 1, 2014.

³ Akio Takayanagi, “Japan: Recent Trends in Aid Policy and Technical Cooperation,” *The Reality of Aid 2016*:

⁴ Ibid.

⁵MoFA, *White Paper on Development Cooperation 2017: Japan’s International Cooperation*.

⁶ JICA, “JICA’s Position Paper on SDGs: Toward Achieving Sustainable Development Goals,” 2016.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ This paper maintains that Japan’s efforts in ODA in gender equality and governance have not been good. In 2015, 41.2% of Japan’s bilateral aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principle and significant objective, above the DAC average 36.3%. But only 1.5% of aid had gender equality as a principle objective, far below the DAC total of 5.0% (OECD, *Aid in Support of Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment: Donors Charts*, 2017.). Also allocation of Japan’s ODA to government and civil society was only 2.1% while the DAC total was 9.6% in 2016. (OECD, “Development Finance Data.”)

⁹ OECD, *Aid in Support of Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment: Donor Charts*, 2018.

¹⁰ OECD, Press Release, 9 April 2018, op.cit.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Akio Takayanagi, “Japan,” *The Reality of Aid: An Independent Review of International Aid*, 1993.

¹³ Government of Japan, “Development Cooperation Charter: For Peace, Prosperity and a Better Future for Everyone,” 2015.

¹⁴ In Japan, regular policy dialogues between CSOs and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA: the implementing agency of Japan’s ODA programs) have been institutionalized since the late-1990s. The “NGO-Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regular Consultation Meetings” has two subcommittees: ODA Policy Council and the Partnership Promotion Committee. The former discusses aid policy while the latter focuses on MoFA’s support schemes for CSOs. Both meet three times a year in addition to a general meeting held once a year. The NGO-JICA consultations are held four times a year.

¹⁵ Although it is only in Japanese language, the list is accessible on MoFA’s website.

¹⁶ Press releases on the two projects (http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001617.html and http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001323.html: accessed 27 February 2018.)

¹⁷ *Asahi Shimbun*, 1 April 2014.

¹⁸ *Sankei Shimbun*, 8 May 2013.

¹⁹ http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001355.html (accessed 27 February 2018)

²⁰ OECD Development Finance Data.

²¹ *OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Japan: 2010*. p.21.

²² https://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/types_of_assistance/oda_loans/step/index.html (accessed 23 March 2018)

²³ *OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Japan: 2010*. p.70.

²⁴ *OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Japan: 2014*. pp.60-61.

²⁵ https://www.jica.go.jp/activities/schemes/finance_co/about/step.html (accessed 24 March

2018. In Japanese language)

²⁶JICA, op.cit.

²⁷ Akio Takayanagi, “Japan: Recent Trends in Aid Policy and Technical Cooperation,” op.cit.

²⁸MoFA, *White Paper on Development Cooperation 2017*, op.cit.

²⁹OECD, *Development Co-operation Report 2017*.

³⁰ Advisory Panel to the Foreign Minister on Climate Change, “Recommendations on Energy: Promote New Diplomacy on Energy through Leading Global Efforts against Climate Change,” 2018. (<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000335204.pdf>: accessed 13 April 2018)