2015 is a fork-in-the-road moment for development and its stakeholders. The year marks a transition from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which many have critiqued as falling far short of their promises, toward a new set of objectives for the international community.

A new global partnership for development is envisioned, one capable of meeting the challenges of a world at the crossroads of interlocking ecological, political and socioeconomic crises. The process no doubt embodies a set of contradictory trends and divergent pathways to get us out of the current impasse, with some recommending more of the same market-oriented paradigms, and others pushing strongly in an opposite direction.

In an aid landscape characterised by unequal power, the competing concerns of global elites, North and South, have persisted in shaping the nature of development partnerships. There continues to be a lack of strong accountability mechanisms for donor states and private sector actors, and agreements on development effectiveness are for the most part voluntary. A comprehensive rights-based approach implemented through global aid architecture is notable only in its absence.

A key question for civil society is whether the convergence of global crises and the shift in economic power from the north to the emerging economies herald a broader, and much hoped-for, shift in development cooperation — toward more equitable, socially just and ecologically sustainable paradigms. Is it possible to secure even limited gains within existing institutions, or are much deeper changes in dominant policy frameworks required to take sustainable development goals seriously beyond 2015? How can partnerships truly work for development? If so, under what conditions are they effective in realizing peoples’ rights?

This chapter considers the aid landscape in the Philippines, a case study of some of the global trends sketched out in the rest of this report. It notes that recent experience in aid partnerships have worked against democratic ownership of development policies in the global South, and concludes that solidarity among peoples and social movements can and should play a more prominent role in partnerships for development in the lead up to 2015 – and beyond.

Partnerships in the Philippines: development for whom?

Critics have long drawn attention to the links between foreign official development assistance (ODA) and a lack of democratic accountability in recipient states. Political institutions suffer where Southern governments and national budgets are tied to external channels of funding. In aid-dependent states, accountability is channelled upward, away from citizens and toward local elites and donors.1
In the Philippines, aid partnerships have been characterised by gross inequalities of power and influence that impact on the government’s ability to carry out domestic policies independently and democratically.

Old paradigms still grace the pages of donor recommendations to national politicians, with ODA increasingly tied to core government programmes. In exchange, donors leverage significant influence on policy making, and debt-incurring loans continue to account for a significant share of ODA disbursements. Decisions about major policy thrusts are still being made behind closed doors in arenas like the Philippine Development Forum (PDF), which brings together foreign donors and leading policy makers, but rarely with adequate participation from civil society.2

ODA partners continue to exert a significant influence on domestic economic priorities (see the Case Study), and at times, relations with donors mirror those between local politicians and business elites. Indeed, politicians, donors, and big business have been found bound together in a web of patronage, corruption and mutual benefit, as when local tycoons profit from Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) involving ODA. Today the legacy of the NBN-ZTE scandal involving Chinese aid under former president Arroyo drags on in a suite of questionable PPP bid-out deals under the Aquino administration3.

In general, there has been a renewed emphasis on the role of the private sector in development – often taken to mean crudely the equation of growth with development – a neoliberal formula that has in many instances encouraged developing country governments to downsize their social role and instead emphasize the need to secure an ‘enabling environment’ for the private sector to take the lead in national development. The impetus for this can be found in the wake of the 2008 global financial crash, when cash-strapped northern aid budgets had, by 2010, begun seeking out private sector-led development strategies to fill short-falls on real ODA.4 ODA flows to the Philippines have been erratic, rising and falling over the past four years,5 though there has been a general decline in gross ODA, especially since the mid-2000s, when increased tax revenues and foreign remittances have shored up budgets to meet MDG targets.6

ODA continues to constitute a major source of budgetary support, however, and with the protracted global crisis and declining overseas remittances, finding more sustainable sources of funding is an open question. By the end of 2013 total ODA to the Philippines amounted to US$12.1 billion, of which the bulk - US$ 9.1 billion – were in loans, financing a significant share of national budgetary allocations. Infrastructure alone received more than half of these loans (US$5.2 billion or 57%), with the agricultural sector a distant second (US$1.3 billion or 15%).

Government observers have pointed to major problems in the country’s absorptive capacity including close to sixty key ODA implementation issues last year.7 It is partly for this reason that Northern donors and international financial institutions (IFIs) continue to exert a powerful influence on domestic policies. Since the 1980s, neoliberal discourses have dominated aid partnerships in the Philippines, with donors proclaiming neoliberalism as the only possible way to lift societies out of poverty. Instead, market-oriented policies, pushed by the IFIs in particular, have come to be identified with falling real growth rates, gutted industries, and weakened democratic institutions.8

Numerous treaties, from the 2005 Paris Declaration to the Accra Agenda for Action
had sought to correct this, with rich countries promising to detach ODA, once and for all, from policy conditionalities and the political considerations of donor states. However by 2011, the Busan Partnership had abandoned any references to aid conditionality. The IFIs have themselves conceded to criticisms about the failures of the neoliberal model, yet many of the old policy frameworks still find their way into ODA, even if they have taken on different forms in recent years.

Through rules that have liberalised trade and eased regulations on the private sector, policy conditionalities tied to ODA have continued to weaken the Philippines’ industrial base and agricultural sector, contributing to unemployment figures that are today among the worst in Asia. ODA disbursements have facilitated a disproportionate emphasis on roads and hard infrastructure spending like ports and skyways — a key demand by private investors with interests in the export sector. This has often come at the expense of agriculture, public services and other social infrastructure investments critical for broad-based, equitable and balanced economic development. In addition, the government’s industrial roadmaps privilege foreign investors and their local counterparts to a significant extent, and feature few provisions to protect domestic enterprises. This orientation is suggested in the links between Australian and New Zealand ODA and the mining sector, where firms from both countries account for about a fourth of all mining investments in the Philippines.

Crucially, donors have done little to work with Philippine institutions to enact more equitable growth policies, or worse, have systematically worked against these goals by warning against domestic support for agriculture and industry, and promoting the privatisation of social services. Indeed, while considerable structural problems in the nation’s economy remain, the Philippines’ current growth trajectory is still held up as the ideal model by development banks and credit rating agencies.

The next sections assess the nature of the country’s current development partnerships, particularly its relations with IFIs such as the World Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Policy recommendations by these institutions have in many ways worked against the principles of democratic ownership, limiting positive development outcomes and the country’s ability to cope with extreme events.

Banking on Development

With support from multilateral banks like the ADB and the WB, the Philippine government has accelerated the liberalisation process to encompass more and more areas of the economy, including the financial sector. A Foreign Equity Law (RA 10574) passed in 2014 has lifted limits on total foreign ownership of banks, with dramatic implications for domestic lending to national industries and the economy’s exposure to the vagaries of international finance capital.

The ADB remains the country’s biggest multilateral lender, at US$625.6 million in loans and grants last year (2013), which stems from a country partnership strategy it sealed with the Aquino administration in 2011. Designed to run through 2016, the ADB is shifting its attention from stand-alone projects and towards lending to government programmes that target key sectors of the economy, including energy, education and agriculture.

Last year, the ADB funneled up to US$372 million to the Philippine government’s KALAHI-CIDSS National Community-Driven Development Project and US$250 million to
Chapter 1: Principles and practices of partnerships

the Local Government Finance and Fiscal Decentralization Reform Program.

These projects are in line with the ADB’s efforts to promote decentralized budgetary mechanisms as a way to encourage efficiency and cut back on corruption. In the context of already weak central governance structures in the Philippines and weak oversight by local government units, the positive gains from these efforts are difficult to assess. KALAHI-CIDSS, for its part, offers the veneer of a bottom-up participatory development programme, but in reality is a top-down affair, with government agencies making many of the key decisions and passing down patchwork poverty reduction projects, often with little consultation from host communities on the ground.

Elsewhere, the ADB has been at the heart of a recent push for Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in several major areas nationwide. PPPs are essentially partnerships between corporations and the government under a shared funding rubric, where investors bid for projects to make up for scant public resources. Private sector control over formerly government-mandated projects is then expected to lead to better efficiency and service delivery. PPPs, however, can be an avenue for the corruption and back-alley dealings that have characterised patronage politics in countries like the Philippines for years, where privatization is leaving basic social services out of reach of millions of impoverished people.

The government has since identified over 55 PPP priority projects in 2014 mostly in infrastructure, but the construction and maintenance of public schools and hospitals are also being given over to greater private sector involvement. This trend includes the ‘modernization’ of the Philippine Orthopedic Center (POC), which risks introducing and raising user fees charged to patients, with a dramatic slash in charity ward space that will leave only 10%, or 70 beds, for indigent patients.

PPP deals have been roundly criticized for favouring bidders from a narrow circle of well-connected business elites and conglomerates that have come to dominate the Philippine economy. Their disproportionate influence on policymaking is seen clearly in the nature of these partnerships, which are among the government’s flagship development programmes.

PPPs often feature generous tax and legal incentives, lax labour regulations, favourable land deals and guaranteed subsidies – courtesy of public money – for companies that are failing to meet their profit targets of their investors.

Some of the corporations involved in PPPs are bidding on multiple projects at the same time. A major public transit system, the Light Rail Transit (LRT) 1 Cavite Extension rail project, for instance, is to be given over to a consortium of investors like Ayala and the Metro Pacific Investments Corporation. These corporations are already investing in several other road and public transit projects. The LRT-1 concession threatens to raise fares by up to 20% to 100%, with guaranteed price hikes every few years, adjusted to inflation and power costs passed on to consumers. The government is to shoulder Php 34.6 billion, or over half of the total project cost (Php 64.9 billion), on top of an additional Php 5 billion for LRM in ‘viability gap funding’, alongside property tax subsidies and other incentives.

Despite these subsidies to the private sector with seemingly limited public benefit, ADB and the former Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) committed to financing US$3 million in grants for technical assistance (TA) to PPPs in 2012, with the explicit aim of increasing
CASE STUDY: Trends both old and new - the geopolitics of aid

Aid ties between the United States and the Philippines offer perhaps the starkest example of ODA’s extended use as an instrument to further foreign policy objectives. Bilateral economic aid from the US has grown by 18.5% per year between 2009 and 2011, or an annual average of US$ 152.2 million. It seeks to raise that figure to US$204.5 million by 2015.4

Already one of the top recipients of US aid in the region, the Philippines has strengthened ties with the United States through economic arrangements like the Partnership for Growth (PFG) and military deals like the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). Formalised this year, EDCA’s constitutionality is still in doubt, as it effectively grants the US military a permanent presence in bases located throughout the country, and even provides for rent-free use of subsidized utilities and local army camps and bases, among other perks.

Rising tensions with China and the US “pivot to Asia” has made ODA all the more useful for its strategic value. But just as alarming in the context of country ownership is the PFG’s potential influence over domestic economic policies.

PFG is an extension of past economic arrangements, but with even more leeway to further trade and investment liberalisation, deregulation, public-private partnerships and other policies to promote free trade, business competitiveness, fiscal austerity and tax reforms.

The PFG is said to align with the Philippine Development Plan (PDP), but also requires direct coordination with American government agencies led by the State Department, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), as well as multilateral donors including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, United Nations (UN) agencies, and non-state representatives from non-government organizations and private corporations.

Its main objective, according to US President Barack Obama’s Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development, is to “elevate economic growth in countries committed to good governance as a core priority for US development efforts.”5 Five-year Joint Country Action Plans (JCAP) are meant to align with PFG objectives, and underscore key areas for policy reforms in partner countries.

PFG’s cornerstone project is the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a five-year, US$433.9 million grant conditional on the country maintaining high ranks on measures of economic freedom as defined by the MCC’s Trade Policy Indicator. Grants are made on the basis of the country’s adherence to open trade policies based on average tariff rates and non-tariff barriers to trade. MCC has funded KALAHI-CIDSS and a $54.3-million Revenue Administration Reform Project (RARP) focused on tax and corruption-related issues.

Under the PFG framework, USAID has been especially aggressive in pushing through The Arangkada Philippines Project (TAPP), in partnership with the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham). A paper prepared by the Joint Foreign Chambers of Commerce in the Philippines (JFC), of which Amcham is a member, outlines starkly what TAPP implies.

The JFC lists no fewer than 471 recommendations that include completely lifting all barriers on foreign capital ownership, amending the Labor Code to allow for easier subcontracting, employee termination, and lifting of minimum wage laws; privatising remaining government-owned corporations, reducing corporate taxes while raising taxes on consumers, among other reforms that collectively amount to charter change. American ODA is financing other projects along these lines:

The Philippines is one of only four countries participating in the PFG - one other being El Salvador, where civil society groups have recently spoken out again the MCC’s considerable influence over the El Salvador government’s economic policies. The potential exists for a significant reinforcement of neoliberal reforms in the Philippines along similar lines.

- Trade-Related Assistance for Development (TRADE) – US$ 12.8 million
- Facilitating Public Investment (FPI) – US$14.8 million
- Investment Enabling Environment (INVEST) – US$ 3.2 million
- Advancing Philippine Competitiveness (COMPETE) - US$ 18.9 million
- Philippine-American Fund – a US$ 24 million project with the objective of aligning civil society organisations, the academe, and other stakeholders behind the PFG

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5 http://www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/partnership-growth

3 Department of National Defense


the number of “well-prepared public-private partnership (PPP) projects for competitive bidding to sustain the positive momentum in the Philippines’ PPP program.”

Following closely on the ADB’s heels is the World Bank, which committed up to US$408 million in loans and grants last year (2013). The Bank is one of the biggest supporters of the Philippine government’s expanded conditional cash transfer (CCT) scheme, and has lent more than US$500 to the programme so far.

CCTs are the Aquino administration’s flagship anti-poverty project, supposedly meant to deliver on the MDGs by encouraging families to send their children to school or be vaccinated, among other requirements, as a precondition for receiving minimal monthly cash grants. Unlike Brazil’s Bolsa Familia cash disbursement scheme, however, CCTs have been rolled out in the absence of wider socioeconomic reforms and wealth redistribution at the national level and amidst declining real wages and the withdrawal of state support to social services, which defeats the programme’s purpose on its own terms.

In addition, CCTs have reached only a tiny proportion of the country’s urban and rural poor and do not provide enough for an average family basic survival. They cut into the state budget for social services and on their own are not a sustainable strategy for poverty reduction as they fail to address the structural causes of poverty. The programme peaks by 2014, at which point the government seeks to target some 4 million families – conveniently in time for the Philippines’ assessment on MDG performance - before a rapid rollback on recipients by 2018.

The Bank listed macroeconomic stability, investment climate improvement, resiliency and public service delivery for the poor as priorities in its 2010-2013 country assistance strategy. It has continued attempts to steer public policy, and committed US$300 million in budgetary support for policy and institutional reforms by the Aquino administration — its single-largest investment in the country last year.

Despite rhetoric on inclusive growth, for the IFIs, development appears to be about developing the private sector, as opposed to making the private sector work for development. There is a failure to recognise and engage the full range of actors that make up the private sector, a phrase that extends far beyond transnational corporations or local conglomerates, and encompasses small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), struggling domestic businesses in developing countries with limited access to capital, smallholder farmers, cooperatives, and the informal sector.

An enabling environment for big business is a poor substitute for an enabling environment for genuine poverty reduction and democratic participation in public policy-making. In the context of broader economic policies that work against equitable development, ad hoc anti-poverty measures, including cash transfers, whatever their immediate benefit to families, cannot address the root causes of poverty.

**Aid in the crosshairs of climate, inequality and geopolitics**

The dangers of the development discourse pushed by IFIs and the country’s other partners fed into the events leading up to, and beyond, super-typhoon Haiyan (loc. Yolanda), which shook the country in November 2013. The disaster was in part a demonstration of the country’s weak adaptive capacity. It also underscored so much of
what aid has come to mean in the context of a changing climate, as the crisis has unfolded.

Haiyan was the strongest typhoon ever to make landfall since records began.\textsuperscript{26} It left up to ten thousand dead, twenty eight thousand injured, and thousands missing. In total, it affected over 16 million people, 4 million of whom were left homeless in a region that was already one of the poorest in the country. Of the 44 provinces affected by the typhoon, many were economically dependent on agriculture. Haiyan wiped out much of Samar and Leyte’s coconut industry, where small farmers had subsisted for decades on lands typically concentrated in a narrow cross-section of plantation owners, foreign and real estate investors.

A combination of economic inequality and environmental vulnerability compounded the storm’s social effects.

The days following Haiyan saw authorities scrambling to make do with limited public resources. Evacuation centres proved inadequate, with many killed as water flooded churches and school buildings where thousands had taken shelter. Local government units had to borrow private vessels for relief operations, as the government had no fleet of its own. Poor coordination between national government agencies and local officials delayed much-needed relief. It was only a matter of time before looting began, and in Tacloban city state security forces arrived before food.\textsuperscript{27} In many affected communities, donations from private companies and non-government organisations (NGOs) were first to arrive.

Reports of petty politicking between government officials, the selling of relief goods in commercial stores, and hoarded aid were rife in the weeks that followed. Relief bunkhouses were deemed flimsy and below basic international standards for safety. Food prices shot through the roof, and yet there were few attempts at easing price inflation on basic commodities through government subsidies. As late as two months after Haiyan, thousands of corpses lay exposed and unburied on the streets of Tacloban, and many had begun to decay, posing a major health risk.

As the country struggled to recover from what was perhaps the worst natural disaster it has ever had to face, the government did not respond, perhaps could not respond, in any other way.

Decades of donor-driven neoliberal reforms have weakened the state’s ability to invest in long-term development that would reduce the population’s vulnerability to climate change. Poverty and underdevelopment aggravate climate impacts, with the absence of adequate government support adding to the difficulties.\textsuperscript{28} Initial government estimates suggested relief and rehabilitation would cost as much as US$5.7 billion and would last longer than reconstruction efforts after the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{29}

The response to the tragedy instead mirrored the nation’s standard economic paradigms. Corporations were at the heart of the government’s rehabilitation drive from the very beginning, as officials stressed the need to give the private sector a leading role in reconstruction efforts. Reversing the traditional role of governments in crisis situations, “rehabilitation czar” Panfilo Lacson insisted that default response to events like Haiyan lay in the private sector, and that the state was only the “fallback” option.\textsuperscript{30} Indeed nine major conglomerates would spearhead relief efforts, including Ayala and the SM Group of companies, with PLDT and the Razon group having “adopted” the worst affected city, Tacloban.\textsuperscript{31} These are corporations with deep pockets in the banking, retail and...
commercial real estate industries, but with little experience managing a disaster of this scale.

All told, the Philippine state has left a void in climate adaptation and social provision that it assumes the private sector will fill.

In December, the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), in partnership with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), drew up Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY), a US$8.3 billion rehabilitation programme designed to run up to 2017. It allocates significant amounts to agriculture (US$428.9 million), infrastructure and housing (US$5.7 billion), industry and services (US$1.6 billion), social protection (US$422.1 million), and local government (US$91.7 million).32

Unfortunately, RAY is also locked into a PPP framework, with private investors playing a major role in the reconstruction projects33, and certain regions given over to a variety of contractors for road rebuilding and housing projects. Civil society observers have raised concerns over the lack of overall coordination for private sector actors, which could complicate the rehabilitation process. The potential for corruption involving competing contractors is real, even for regular road repairs in non-disaster situations.

Significantly, foreign loans are to guarantee these investments, and all this in turn has been funded through debt. The ADB and World Bank have collectively lent at least US$1 billion, against UN recommendations that rehabilitation funds be disbursed through grants.34 To monitor these aid flows, the government launched FAiTH, the Foreign Aid Transparency Hub, an online data portal providing reports on funds received from major donors. However even this has proved controversial. While the website does provide a significant amount of information, the site suffers from data inconsistencies and accessibility issues, in addition to a failure to break down the raw data to track where and how aid is spent at the grassroots level.35 Ensuring full participation from civil society and recipient communities in monitoring aid flows can help resolve transparency issues.

In any case, all bids at transparency will prove inadequate if aid fails to reach people on the ground through equitable and sustainable channels, and in a manner that ensures the long-term recovery of typhoon survivors so that they – not big business – can rebuild better.

Conclusion: An alternative global partnership for development

The experiences of the Philippines with donors and their conditionalities show that development partnerships, as currently conceived and practiced, cannot prepare us for the challenges of the decades ahead. While civil society pressure has opened up channels for debate on development alternatives, policy space for these fora is limited and their effectiveness is an open question. Those seeking to promote deeper shifts in the development discourse, with an emphasis on people-centred approaches, must ultimately grapple with the reality of a world dominated by market-oriented paradigms.

This brings us to the heart of the debate: Is it at all possible to reform donor-recipient relationships in a manner that delivers results to people on the ground? Or are they inherently unequal and deeper shifts toward more participatory and democratic forms of development are needed? What role can partnerships between civil society actors and other non-state actors play in fostering alternative models for sustainable development?

If the goal of sustainable development is to expand human choices, and enable all to live lives
of satisfaction and wellbeing in harmony with the planet, then a new global partnership for development cannot be based on the paradigms of the past.

To move forward, we begin with what has to end: donors must end all aid conditionalities, untie all aid, and adhere to the development effectiveness principles embodied in past agreements, and in particular make a stronger commitment to respect country ownership, equity and solidarity built around human rights based approaches (HRBAs).

The advancement of human rights, gender equality, decent work, and environmental sustainability must be explicit objectives of aid — this is above all a political, more than a technical, project.

At the local level, development ‘partnerships’ that privilege exclusive top-down relations between state and private sector actors must give way to more inclusive, participatory platforms that engage with the marginalised and excluded, and are committed to meeting people’s needs and concerns on the ground.

Aid partnerships have to date been restricted to narrow state-state and state-private sector affairs that downplay the role of civil society. Development assistance at all stages, from planning to execution, must instead be rooted in the active participation of citizens, above all the marginalised and impoverished, who stand to gain or lose the most from development, however development is conceived. For this reason states and non-state actors must foster an enabling environment for people’s meaningful participation in development — a major shift from the old focus on providing an enabling environment for transnational business investment.

At the national level, poverty reduction strategies should be aligned with strategies developed in partnership with civil society and other actors and rooted in diversity of local needs and concerns. Empowerment — political, social, and economic — should be at the heart of these discourses, and can begin with strengthening poor people’s access to political institutions, enhancing their control of productive assets, providing support for vulnerable populations as they adapt to climate change, and reversing decades of neoliberal policies.

CSOs can play a key role in this through participatory review processes, independent monitoring of ODA and government performance, research and knowledge sharing, and through support for local level development initiatives.

At the regional level, partnerships could be patterned after progressive initiatives in Latin America, like the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – Peoples’ Trade Treaty (ALBA), where the basis of unity is an explicit departure from dominant neoliberal paradigms, a stated commitment to participatory democracy, and an economic regime rooted in social equality, public welfare, and environmental sustainability. ALBA has had its own problems, not least in ensuring consistency with the progressive brand of politics it claims to bring to the region. Yet its emphasis on empowering civil society stands in stark contrast to current forms of regionalization, as seen in the case of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) where concerns for economic growth, military ties and business investment tend to be key objectives, with human welfare and the environment relegated to secondary importance. New country partnerships and trading blocs ought to be built around mutual accountability, new cooperative trade policies, progressive intellectual property rights regimes, knowledge sharing and technical cooperation and equal parity with partners in development.

At the international level, a civil society that links up and unites to pressure governments to act
on their commitments is the only way to move forward. There is a need to counteract the creeping influence of transnational corporations and the traditional dominance of powerful country blocs in the United Nations, as well as to secure leverage for civil society and south country partners, free all debts still held by the South, provide for citizen-led mechanisms that can hold governments to account at the international level, promote effective international cooperation for climate adaptation and mitigation, and enhance human rights regulatory frameworks and accountability mechanisms for transnational private sector actors and states alike. In this way, we can move toward an alternative global partnership for development that will be worth its name.

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15 ibid

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